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IF YOU GAG THE LAWYERS, DO YOU CHOKE
THE COURTS? SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR
JUDGES WHEN FUNDING RESTRICTIONS
CURB ADVOCACY BY LAWYERS
ON BEHALF OF THE POOR
Laura K. Abel and David S. Udell*
You are a county court judge. A woman, through her lawyer,
tells you that her husband has just broken her arm and given her a
black eye. She requests a restraining order, which you grant. The
order requires the husband to leave the house and to avoid all face-
to-face and telephone contact with the woman.
Two weeks later, the woman is back in court. Her lawyer tells
you that the husband came by the house the previous night. When
the woman refused to let him in, he broke down the door and
threatened her with a gun. Perceiving a need to deter the defen-
dant from assaulting his wife and to vindicate the court's authority,
you hold the husband in civil contempt and order him to pay his
wife's attorneys' fees.
At this point, the woman's lawyer tells you that Congress has
barred you-a state court judge-from ordering an attorneys' fee
award.1 Although the attorney's salary is paid by a domestic vio-
lence grant from the state, the attorney's office receives some of its
funding from the federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC). Con-
* Laura K. Abel is an Associate Counsel with, and David S. Udell is the Direc-
tor of, the Poverty Program of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University
School of Law. Both are counsel in the ongoing litigation regarding some of the fed-
eral restrictions on legal services lawyers captioned Velazquez v. Legal Services Cor-
poration, No. 97 Civ.00182 (E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 14, 1997), and Dobbins v. Legal
Services Corporation, No. 01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001). The authors
thank the Hon. Juanita Bing Newton, New York State Deputy Chief Administrative
Judge for Justice Initiatives, for her helpful comments. The authors also thank Burt
Neuborne for contributing his invaluable insights into the federalism and separation
of powers implications of the federal restrictions. Finally, the authors gratefully ac-
knowledge the assistance of Stacy Antonucci, Jennie Rabinowitz, Sarah Netburn,
Craig L. Siegel and Travis J. Tu in conducting research that was helpful in writing this
article. Notwithstanding the valuable assistance the authors have received, the views
expressed herein, and any errors, are attributable solely to the authors.
1. For a description of the federal attorneys' fee award restriction, see the discus-
sion infra note 14 and accompanying text.
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gress prohibits LSC grantees from seeking or accepting fee awards
in most circumstances.2
This scenario illustrates how restrictions on legal services lawyers
interfere with core functions of the courts. This article will ex-
amine restrictions on legal services lawyers that are particularly
likely to cause such interference. These restrictions include federal
and state restrictions on participating in class actions, claiming at-
torneys' fee awards, representing certain categories of clients (such
as prisoners and certain immigrants), and representing clients in
certain categories of claims (such as public housing drug eviction
cases).
This article will also examine the effect on state courts of federal
restrictions on the funding that state and local governments pro-
vide for legal services. Such restrictions cause problems for the
courts, including (1) interfering with the ability of courts to certify
classes and award fees in appropriate cases; (2) interfering with the
ability of courts to ensure that all people subjected to wrongful
treatment are provided relief; (3) interfering with the deterrent ef-
fect of court orders; (4) interfering with the ability of the courts to
decide cases with all relevant facts before them; (5) permitting de-
fendants to insulate their wrongful practices from judicial review;
(6) reducing the ability of the courts to prevent themselves from
being used for illegitimate ends, such as harassment; (7) reducing
2. This scenario is based on a case handled by LSC grantee MidPenn Legal Ser-
vices, Inc. The specific acts of domestic violence and the source of the lawyer's fund-
ing described in this hypothetical are not necessarily the same as in the MidPenn case.
In the MidPenn case, the program obtained an order of protection for a client from
the county court. LSC, Office of Legal Affairs, External Op. 2001-1007 (2001); Tele-
phone Interview with Michelle DeBord, Executive Director of MidPenn Legal Ser-
vices, Inc. (Jan. 4, 2002). When the defendant subsequently violated the order, the
court ordered the defendant to pay the client's attorneys' fees. LSC, Office of Legal
Affairs, External Op. 2001-1007 (2001); Telephone Interview with Michelle DeBord,
Executive Director of MidPenn Legal Services, Inc. (Jan. 4, 2002). The MidPenn at-
torney told the judge that she could not accept the fees, but the judge persisted in
ordering them. Telephone Interview with Michelle DeBord, Executive Director of
MidPenn Legal Services, Inc. (Jan. 4, 2002). Pennsylvania state court judges have the
authority to award fees under the governing domestic violence statute, 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 61141.1 (West 2001), and under the inherent power of the courts. See
Brocker v. Brocker, 241 A.2d 336, 338 (Pa. 1968). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has noted that courts have this inherent power in part because "[t]he interests of
orderly government demand that respect and compliance be given to orders issued by
courts possessed of jurisdiction of persons and subject matter." Bata v. Central-Penn
Nat'l Bank, 249 A.2d 767, 768 (Pa. 1969). Notwithstanding these important interests,
and even though "the judge in this matter might be disappointed by his or her inabil-
ity to award fees ... in this case," LSC warned the attorney that if she accepted the
fees her program would lose all federal funding. LSC Office of Legal Affairs, Exter-
nal Op. 2001-1007 (2001).
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the ability of courts and other state legal services funders to allo-
cate money to improve the administration of justice; and (8) in-
creasing the amount of pro se litigation in the courts.
Finally, this article will discuss the separation of powers and fed-
eralism implications of these incursions into court operations. This
article will apply the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Legal Ser-
vices Corp. v. Velazquez, in which the Court struck down a federal
funding restriction that prohibited lawyers in programs that receive
federal LSC funding from challenging welfare reform laws.4 The
Court was deeply troubled by a rule aimed at depriving federal
courts of their supreme authority to resolve constitutional ques-
3. There have been few studies that have seriously examined the impact of legal
services restrictions on the courts, clients, lawyers, or the larger society. The Brennan
Center for Justice has authored several reports containing information about the ef-
fects of the federal restrictions. See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RESTRICTING
LEGAL SERVICES: How CONGRESS LEFT THE POOR WITH ONLY HALF A LAWYER(2000); BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BEARING WITNESS: LEGAL SERVICES CLIENTS
TELL THEIR STORIES (2000); BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, LEFT OUT IN THE COLD:
How CLIENTS ARE AFFECTED BY RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR LEGAL SERVICES LAW-
YERS (2000); BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, MAKING THE CASE: LEGAL SERVICES FOR
THE POOR (1999). These reports are available online at http://www.brennancenter.org.
Other reports that contain evidence about the effects of the federal restrictions
include ATLANTA LEGAL AID Soc'Y & GA. LEGAL SERVS. PROGRAM, STATE PLAN-
NING REPORT FOR GEORGIA (1998) (finding that prisoners and undocumented immi-
grants lack access to legal services due to restrictions barring LSC grantees from
representing members of those groups); LEGAL SERVS. OF N.J., JUSTICE FOR ALL
2000: A MASTER PLAN FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN NEW JERSEY (1998) (finding that
federal restrictions on LSC grantees cause inefficiencies in the way prospective clients
are processed and referred and deny essential legal assistance to people in need); see
also infra note 26 and accompanying text (regarding gaps in access to legal services
caused by the restrictions); PUB. INTEREST CLEARINGHOUSE, CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES
FOR Low INCOME CALIFORNIANS: RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSALS (undated)
(finding that the federal restrictions barring LSC grantees from bringing class actions,
representing clients before legislative bodies, and seeking attorneys' fee awards limit
clients' ability to obtain effective representation and remedies).
The Brennan Center is currently preparing to conduct a comprehensive examina-
tion of the impact of the LSC restrictions in some states.
In the fall of 2000, LSC announced that it had appointed a commission to examine
the impact of the LSC restriction prohibiting attorneys' fee award claims and of 45
C.F.R. § 1610.8, which permits LSC grantees to use non-LSC funds for purposes oth-
erwise prohibited by Congress, but only if they establish an objectively and physically
separate entity that receives no LSC funding. LSC Bd. of Dirs., Resolution Establish-
ing a Special Commission to Study and Report on the Effect of Certain Legal Restric-
tions on Persons Eligible for LSC-Funded Legal Assistance, Resolution 2000-009
(Sept. 18, 2000) (on file with the authors). However, LSC subsequently announced
the indefinite suspension of this proposed study. E-mail from Mauricio Vivero, Vice
President, LSC, to David S. Udell, Poverty Program Director, Brennan Center for
Justice (Jan. 30, 2001, 12:05:51 EST) (on file with the authors).
4. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001).
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tions.5 The Velazquez opinion did not, however, explore the legal
implications of the effects on the courts of other federal or state
legal services restrictions.6 In papers filed in December 2001, the
plaintiffs in Velazquez, as well as in a companion case entitled
Dobbins v. Legal Services Corp., requested that the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York consider the First
Amendment, separation of powers, and federalism implications of
federal restrictions on non-federal funding received by LSC grant-
ees, as well as of the class action, attorneys' fee award, and public
outreach restrictions on LSC funding.7 At the time of writing, the
court had not yet issued a decision.
I. DESCRIPTION OF LEGAL SERVICES RESTRICTIONS
A discussion of legal services restrictions must begin with the
conditions the United States Congress imposed in 1996 on legal
programs that receive any funding from LSC. 8 These restrictions
5. See id. at 546.
6. In denying a preliminary injunction as to many of those, the Second Circuit
did not address the separation of powers or federalism implications of such restric-
tions. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999). The Supreme
Court denied certiorari as to this decision. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S.
903 (2001). This denial of the certiorari petition has no precedential value. See
Hopfmann v. Connolly, 471 U.S. 459, 461 (1985); Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, Inc.,
338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950); Pireno v. N.Y. State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387, 395
n.13 (2d Cir. 1981).
In a separate case, the Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutional implications of
some of the 1996 restrictions, but did not address the separation of powers or federal-
ism implications of any of the restrictions. Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs.
Corp., 145 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1998).
7. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 97 Civ.00182 (E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 14,
1997); Dobbins v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14,
2001).
8. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53 to 1321-56 (1996). The 1996 restrictions
have been annually renewed by Congress in substantially similar form in each of
LSC's subsequent appropriations acts. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 502, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-59 to 3009-60 (1996); De-
partments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 502(a)(2), 111 Stat. 2440, 2510-11
(1997); Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title V, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-107 (1998); Consolidated Ap-
propriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, Title V, 113 Stat 1501,1501A-49 (1999);
D.C. Appropriations - FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-553, Title V, 114 Stat. 2762, 2762A-
101 (2000); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-77, Title V, 115 Stat. 748, 794-95
(2001). For information about earlier restrictions applicable to programs receiving
funding from LSC, see Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996e, 2996f,
2996i, and 2996j (2001).
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have had a tremendous impact because Congress applied them not
only to activities supported by LSC funds, but also to all activities
engaged in by any entity that receives even a penny of LSC fund-
ing.9 Several lawsuits challenged this "entity restriction" as an un-
constitutional infringement of the right to spend one's own funds in
support of protected political speech.10 These challenges per-
suaded LSC to authorize LSC grantees to dedicate their non-LSC
funds to various forms of restricted advocacy, but only if such pro-
grams do so through an "objectively" and physically separate en-
tity, with separate staff, offices and equipment.1' LSC calls this
regulation the "program integrity" regulation.12
The restrictions that Congress passed in 1996 include the
following:
" No CLASS ACTIONS - LSC grantees may not initiate or partici-
pate in class actions on behalf of their clients, even where the
legal effort is simply to file an amicus brief or to co-counsel
with lawyers who receive no LSC funding. 3
* NO AT-'ORNEYS' FEE AWARDS - Clients of LSC grantees may
not claim court-awarded attorneys' fees, even in cases in which
their opponents seek fees. This is true even when the availa-
bility of attorneys' fees reflects a legislative judgment that the
right at stake is sufficiently critical to warrant special incen-
9. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53 (1996) ("None of the funds appropri-
ated in this Act to the Legal Services Corporation may be used to provide financial
assistance to any person or entity [that engages in prohibited activities]."). See also
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, § 504(d)(1), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-56 (1996) ("[N]o recipient shall accept funds
from any source other than the Corporation, unless ... the recipient ... notifies in
writing the source of the funds that the funds may not be expended for any purpose
prohibited by the Legal Services Corporation Act or this title."); 45 C.F.R. § 1610.1
(2001) ("This part is designed to implement statutory restrictions on the use of non-
LSC funds by LSC recipients and to ensure that no LSC-funded entity shall engage in
any restricted activities . . ").
10. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Legal Aid
Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Haw. 1997); Varshavsky v.
Perales, No. 40767/91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 1996). See also Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw.
v. Legal Servs. Corp., 981 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Haw. 1997), vacated in part, 145 F.3d 1017
(9th Cir. 1998).
11. 45 C.F.R. § 1610.8 (2001). See also 45 C.F.R. § 1610 (2001) (stating in pream-
ble that Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw., 145 F.3d at 1017, and Velazquez, 985 F. Supp. at 323,
prompted LSC's promulgation and subsequent revision of § 1610.8); Velazquez, 985 F.
Supp. at 328-37 (discussing evolution of § 1610.8).
12. 45 C.F.R. § 1610.8 (2001).
13. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 1617 (2001). The effects of this restriction on the courts are
discussed infra notes 33-53 and accompanying text.
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tives to attract quality representation or when the court
desires to use its inherent powers to award fees in order to
vindicate its authority.14
" No REPRESENTATION OF MANY CATEGORIES OF IMMIGRANTS -
LSC grantees generally may not assist undocumented immi-
grants and many categories of documented immigrants. 15 For
example, a migrant farmworker with a valid work visa subject
to illegal indentured servitude cannot seek advice from an
LSC grantee willing and able to use non-federal funds to re-
present him.
" NO REPRESENTATION OF PRISONERS IN CIVIL LITIGATION -
LSC grantees may not represent incarcerated persons, even in
a suit unrelated to the incarceration, such as a child custody
proceeding or a housing court matter, even if the claim arose
14. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 1642 (2001). While the federal attorneys' fee award restric-
tion does not bar LSC grantees from seeking or accepting "[playments received as a
result of sanctions imposed by a court for violations of court rules or practices, or
statutes relating to court practice, including Rule 11 or discovery rules of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or similar State court rules or practices, or statutes," 45
C.F.R. § 1642.2(b)(3), it does bar those lawyers from claiming, or collecting and re-
taining, all other types of fee awards made "pursuant to common law or Federal or
State law permitting or requiring the awarding of such fees." Id. § 1642.2(a). The
effects of this restriction on the courts are discussed infra notes 54-80 and accompany-
ing text.
15. See generally 45 C.F.R. pt. 1626 (2001). Congress has only permitted LSC
grantees to represent certain categories of immigrants. See 45 C.F.R. § 1626.5. These
include permanent residents, refugees, asylees, certain specially admitted agricultural
workers, and aliens falling into several additional categories. Id. §§ 1626.5, 1626.11.
There are many aliens lawfully in this country who do not fall into these categories
and are consequently ineligible for representation. These include workers recruited
and brought into this country by their employers under the federal H-2B visa program
for nonagricultural employees; individuals granted temporary protected status be-
cause they are from countries, like Honduras and Nicaragua, that the U.S. has recog-
nized as being unsafe; asylum applicants; parolees; special immigrant juveniles
(undocumented children adjudicated state dependents because of abandonment, neg-
lect, or abuse); aliens in exclusion or deportation proceedings; aliens who have not
filed for permanent residence but who are the spouses, parents or unmarried children
under age twenty-one of U.S. citizens; individuals on temporary visas (e.g., student
visas), and others. Additionally, undocumented aliens are generally ineligible for rep-
resentation. See 45 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (2001).
The only exceptions are that LSC grantees may use non-LSC funds to represent
aliens, regardless of alienage status, who have been battered by their spouses, who
have been battered by members of their spouse's family (under some circumstances),
or whose children have been battered by their spouses (under some circumstances).
Id. § 1626.4(a). Additionally, LSC grantees may use non-LSC funds to represent
aliens, regardless of alienage status, who are the victims of trafficking in persons.
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b) (2001).
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before the incarceration or the prisoner has not yet been
tried. 16
* NO REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLE IN CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF
CLAIMS - LSC grantees may not represent people in abortion-
related litigation,17 or public housing tenants facing eviction
based on an accusation of drug-related crimes.' 8 The LSC Act
contains additional subject-matter restrictions.' 9
" No PUBLIC INTEREST OUTREACH - LSC grantees may not ap-
proach victims of legal violations to inform them of their rights
and then offer to represent them in seeking remedies.2" A
lawyer cannot, for example, make a presentation at a homeless
shelter regarding the residents' rights to apply for food stamps,
inform the residents that he or she is available to represent
them if they have been denied this right, and then represent
those people who accept the lawyer's offer of assistance.
In addition to these federal restrictions on LSC funds and non-
LSC funds, many providers of legal services operate under addi-
tional restrictions attached to state, local, Interest on Lawyer Trust
Accounts (IOLTA) 2' and other funds dedicated to financing legal
representation of the poor. In some instances, these restrictions
track the LSC restrictions. 22 In other instances, the restrictions are
novel. For example, some prohibit litigation against the state when
it is providing the funding;23 at least two prohibit representation of
migrant workers in employment matters;24 and others prohibit rep-
16. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 1637 (2001).
17. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, § 504(a)(14), 110 Stat. 1321-55 (1996).
18. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 1633 (2001).
19. See supra note 8.
20. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 1638 (2001).
21. The names of these funds vary from state to state. In New York, for example,
the account is called the Interest on Lawyer Account Fund (IOLA).
22. For example, several states prohibit legal services grantees from engaging in
class actions. See, e.g., 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. 765/40 (West 2001); IND. CODE § 33-2.1-
11-4 (2002 electronic update); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-2-714 (2001); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-808 (2001); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 51.943 (Vernon 1998); WASH. REV.
CODE § 43.08.260 (1998); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS OF GA., DESCRWi'rION OF
GRANT PROGRAM 2 (2000), (on file with the authors) available at http://
www2.state.ga.us./Courts/aoc/funding.pdf.
23. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1485(11)(a) (1996) (stating that state funds
may not be used "to provide legal services in relation to any lawsuit against the state
of Michigan unless the claim against the state had been the subject of an administra-
tive proceeding").
24. See 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. 765/40 (2001) ("A recipient may not use funds re-
ceived under this Act to file an individual action or class action under the Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (29 U.S.C. 1801 and following) or other
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resentation of categories of clients or claims or prohibit lawyers
from seeking certain remedies on behalf of clients. z5
II. IMPACT OF LEGAL SERVICES RESTRICTIONS ON
CLIENTS AND LAWYERS
If restrictions on legal services only affected a few clients and
lawyers, then other lawyers could perhaps provide the representa-
tion that legal services lawyers are prohibited from providing. Un-
fortunately, hundreds of thousands of clients are restricted in what
they can do - and in many parts of the country there is no one
else to help them.26
labor laws."); E-mail from Mark Braley, Executive Director, Legal Services Corpora-
tion of Virginia, to Marilyn Goss et al. (Jan. 26, 2001, 16:25:41 EST) (on file with the
authors) (stating that state funds may no longer be used to represent migrant workers
in employment matters).
25. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-474.3(c)(5) (2000) ("No [state] funds shall be
used . . .[t]o provide legal assistance to persons with mental handicaps residing in
State institutions with regard to the terms and conditions of the treatment or services
provided to them by the State."); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 51.943(c) (Vernon 1998)
("Funds from the basic civil legal services account may be used to support a lawsuit
brought by an individual ... to compel a governmental entity to provide benefits ....
but not to support a claim for actual or punitive damages."); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
COURTS OF GA., DESCRIPTION OF GRANT PROGRAM 2 (2000) (stating that govern-
ment funds subsidizing legal services to persons victimized by domestic violence may
not be used in divorce or deportation proceedings), (on file with the authors) availa-
ble at http://www2.state.ga.us./Courts/aoc/funding.pdf.
26. For example, a task force on access to justice acting under the auspices of the
Alaska Supreme Court has concluded that as a combined result of funding cuts and
federal restrictions on LSC grantee Alaska Legal Services, "[t]here are large groups
of people who are no longer eligible to receive Alaska Legal Services assistance and
no other organization in place that can fill the gap to meet these needs." ALASKA
ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE TASK FORCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (2000).
Similar gaps in service exist in many parts of the country. See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUSTICE: LEFT OUT IN THE COLD, supra note 3, at 20 (quoting Pennsylvania Jus-
tice Center attorney Peter Zurflieh as saying, "Low-income families and individuals in
rural Pennsylvania have no one to represent them before their state legislators, since
the LSC restrictions prevent their advocates from ever playing that role."); BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RESTRICTING LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at 18-22 (reporting
gaps in services in the rural deep South, Florida, Tennessee, Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island); PA. STATE PLANNING STEERING COMM., PENNSYLVANIA AGENDA FOR LE-
GAL SERVICES, 1998-2001: THE ACTION PLAN FOR A STATEWIDE INTEGRATED LEGAL
SERVICES DELIVERY SYSTEM 32-34 (1998) (finding that clients outside of Philadelphia
lack adequate access to legal services programs that are not subject to federal restric-
tions); TEX. LSC STATE PLANNING COMM. FOR THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS. TO
THE POOR, THE 1998 TEXAS PLAN: PLANNING FOR THE DELIVERY OF CIVIL LEGAL
SERVICES IN TEXAS (1998) (finding that very few legal services programs in Texas
serve those clients who LSC grantees cannot serve since programs that receive state
IOLTA funds are subject to similar restrictions).
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Over $780 million in funds are dedicated annually to the provi-
sion of civil legal services nationwide. Several hundred million dol-
lars come from federal funding allocated to LSC, and hundreds of
millions of additional dollars come from federal, state and local
governments, IOLTA funds, and private donations (including those
of foundations, corporations, bar associations, and lawyer fund
drives). 27 The federal restrictions applicable to LSC funding en-
cumber approximately $329.3 million in 2002.28 These funds fi-
nance advocacy in more than 200 legal services offices spread
throughout the fifty states and several federal territories. These
offices provide representation in roughly one million matters annu-
ally.29 The LSC restrictions also encumber almost $300 million of
the resources that LSC grantees receive annually from federal,
state and local governments, IOLTA funds, and various private
sources. 3° An additional $62 million in non-LSC funds carries an
independent set of restrictions, imposed in most instances by state
or local governments or IOLTA governing structures. 31 In total, ap-
proximately $660 million in scarce legal services funding is encum-
bered each year by restrictions: this amounts to about eighty-five
percent of all legal services funding.32
III. IMPACT OF LEGAL SERVICES RESTRICTIONS ON JUDGES
Judges occupy a unique institutional role allowing them to ob-
serve patterns in the administration of justice. They are well situ-
ated to assess how legal services restrictions burden the courts and
cause injustice to individual litigants. This section catalogues some
of those effects.
27. Meredith McBurney, Resource Development Data: Why We Gather It and
What We Learn From It, MGMT. INFO. EXCHANGE J., Fall 2001, at 14, 15.
28. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748, 794 (2001).
This figure may slightly overstate the amount of money actually distributed to legal
services programs. In 2001, when the federal government allocated approximately
$329 million to LSC, LSC in turn distributed approximately $287 million to local pro-
grams. McBurney, supra note 27, at 15.
29. LSC, SERVING THE CIVIL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS - A SPECIAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 1, 7 (2000), available at http://www.lsc.gov/pressr/EXSUM.pdf.
In 1999, LSC grantees closed approximately 924,000 cases. Id.
30. LSC, 1999 ACTUAL REVENUE REPORT 1 (1999) (on file with the authors).
31. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A CHART OF RESTRICTIONS ON STATE AND
IOLTA FUNDING (2001) (on file with the authors).
32. Id.
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A. Bans on Participating in Class Actions
Restrictions prohibiting legal services lawyers from participating
in class actions33 warp court functions in several ways. First, class
action restrictions selectively introduce inefficiency into judicial
proceedings. 34 By barring some lawyers from participating in class
actions, the rules prevent parties represented by those lawyers
from initiating such an action, even where it is the most efficient
way to proceed. For instance, MFY Legal Services, Inc., a LSC
grantee, is currently working with a private pro bono attorney to
bring a lawsuit on behalf of certain mentally disabled people. The
lawsuit alleges that the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority
(MTA) is unlawfully discriminating against mentally disabled sub-
way riders entitled to reduced fares.35 A class action would be the
most efficient form of lawsuit, because thousands of affected sub-
way riders have virtually identical claims. As an LSC grantee,
however, MFY Legal Services, Inc. cannot represent clients in a
class action. It can only proceed on behalf of individual clients,
which significantly increases the burden on the courts.36 If MFY's
clients were represented by lawyers able to engage in class actions,
this added burden would be removed.
The second effect of class action restrictions is that they interfere
with the courts' ability to ensure that low income persons learn of
court-ordered remedies that may be available to them. While a
court presiding over a class action can require a defendant to iden-
tify all persons harmed by a challenged practice, a court's capacity
to require disclosure of such information is circumscribed where
there is only a single litigant.37 If a lawyer subject to a class action
33. See, e.g., supra notes 13, 22 and accompanying text.
34. See Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to
Low-Income Persons, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1751, 1753 (1999) (urging that legal ser-
vices lawyers not be subjected to class action restrictions because such restrictions
that lead to repetitive litigation which wastes judicial resources and can lead to incon-
sistent decisions); see also Daan Braveman, Class Action Certification in State Court
Welfare Litigation: A Request for Procedural Justice, 28 BuFF. L. REV. 57, 77 (1979)
(arguing that the availability of the class action device "removes the necessity for
duplicative lawsuits by those who secure representation").
35. Decl. of David F. Dobbins dated Dec. 5, 2001 (on file with the authors), Dob-
bins v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001).
36. MFY Legal Services, Inc. is a plaintiff in Dobbins v. Legal Services Corp.
These and other facts regarding the effects of the federal restrictions on MFY Legal
Services, Inc. and its clients are set forth in the Declaration of David F. Dobbins
dated December 5, 2001 (on file with the authors), Dobbins v. Legal Services Corp.,
No. 01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001).
37. Lucy Billings, a former lawyer at LSC grantee Bronx Legal Services and a
current New York City Civil Court Judge, has said that one difficulty that the federal
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restriction represents a single litigant alleging adverse conditions in
an adult home, for instance, the court cannot order the adult home
defendant to identify, or provide relief to, all persons subject to the
same wrongful treatment. As a result, many affected persons will
never receive any relief. LSC grantee South Brooklyn Legal Ser-
vices faced a similar situation when it successfully represented a
mother on welfare seeking to compel New York City to reimburse
her for her childcare expenses based on a 4.3-week month rather
than on an incorrect formula using a 4-week month.38 New York
City settled the claim by agreeing to pay the woman $12,000 in
retroactive child care costs and by abandoning its incorrect reim-
bursement formula.39 In the absence of a class action, however, it
has proved impossible to obtain relief for all the other indigent
mothers who New York City unlawfully deprived of childcare
reimbursements.n°
The inability of courts to ensure that institutional defendants
provide relief to eligible people extends beyond retroactive com-
pensation. Even when a court rules that a defendant has acted un-
lawfully with respect to one plaintiff, the defendant may not cease
its unlawful behavior with respect to similarly situated individuals
unless each of them sues or unless a class action permits a court to
protect all affected individuals. According to Charles Delbaum,
Litigation Director with LSC grantee New Orleans Legal Assis-
tance Corporation, the local housing authority refuses to hold
grievance hearings within the time period required by federal regu-
lations. Because he cannot bring a class action to change agency
class action restriction imposed on her practice is that "class actions provide procedu-
ral mechanisms through notice to the class, for example, and discovery,.., to find out
about and make contact with others whose rights are being threatened who would not
otherwise be protected." Staci Rosche et al., Implementation Issues Panel, 25 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 321, 329 (1998).
38. South Brooklyn Legal Services is a plaintiff in Dobbins v. Legal Services Corp.
These and other facts regarding the effects of federal restrictions on South Brooklyn
Legal Services are set forth in the Declaration of John C. Gray dated November 29,
2001, Dobbins v. Legal Services Corp., No. 01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14,
2001).
39. Id.
40. Id. Likewise, LSC grantee MFY Legal Services, Inc., which wishes to work
with a private pro bono lawyer to represent certain mentally disabled people alleging
that the MTA is unlawfully discriminating against mentally disabled subway riders for
reduced fares, Decl. of David F. Dobbins dated Dec. 5, 2001 (E.D.N.Y.), Dobbins v.
Legal Servs. Corp., No. 01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001), must bring the
suit as a class action in order to identify all class members who have unlawfully been
denied reduced fares, and in order to provide a remedy for all of them. However, the
federal class action restriction prohibits MFY Legal Services, Inc. from proceeding in
this manner. See id.
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policy, he must file virtually the same individual suit "over and
over to make them follow rules that are already in place. "41
The third effect of class action restrictions is that they selectively
interfere with the ability of courts to rule on a complete record and
order complete relief. In some instances, the litigant represented
by a lawyer subject to a class action restriction may be handicapped
in developing the strongest set of facts to support his or her claim.
For example, the client may be able to obtain discovery of a defen-
dant's practices and procedures with respect to himself, but not
with respect to other persons' cases, as he would be able to do in a
class action.42 The result is an incomplete record. This poses a par-
ticular problem when an individual's substandard treatment results
from a systemic problem that is certain to recur absent a systemic
remedy. If, for example, the client is a welfare recipient who has
missed a monthly welfare check, the client will be able to conduct
discovery regarding the fact that the welfare agency never sent out
his check. If the welfare agency's failure to send the check is the
result of a systemic problem such as a faulty computer system,
however, the individual client will probably not be able to obtain
discovery of that fact and inform the court. Consequently, the
court will never learn the complete facts about the defendant's rel-
evant practices and procedures. The client and similarly situated
individuals will have to return to court repeatedly with the same
problem, thus increasing the burden on the courts.43
41. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE: RESTRICTING LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at
12-13; see also Braveman, supra note 34, at 79-80 (1979) (describing case brought by
individual plaintiffs in which, even after a federal district court held unconstitutional
New York's requirement that female welfare recipients identify the putative fathers of
their children, the welfare agency continued to apply the requirement to other welfare
recipients); Jeffrey Freedman, New Rulings Move SSA Away From Policy of "Non-
Acquiescence," N.Y. ST. B.J., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 22 (in the 1980s the federal Social
Security Administration refused to apply one federal court of appeals ruling to cases
involving claimants in other circuits).
42. Valerie Bogart, an attorney at Legal Services for the Elderly in New York, a
LSC grantee, has noted that she and her clients face this problem under the federal
restrictions: "We filed a case in state court. It looks like a class action challenging
policies and practices, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Since it doesn't have
the words 'class action,' we're not representing anyone besides our named plaintiff.
When the time comes to start discovery, we'll be limited." Rosche et al., supra note
37, at 327.
43. Marie A. Failinger and Larry May discuss a similar hypothetical:
Consider the poor person who experiences periodic and increasing delays in
obtaining Social Security payments. The source of the problem may be man-
agement and budget policies, which may not be remediable by even a hun-
dred successful individual suits. Institutional change rarely results from
individual suits because individual problems are not traceable much beyond
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The Third Circuit addressed a similar scenario in a case brought
by sixteen foster children who claimed widespread deficiencies in
the state's child welfare system." Each child sought injunctive re-
lief from harms caused by a lack of trained caseworkers, medical
and educational service providers, foster parents, and potential
adoptive families. Each child also sought declaratory judgments
that the system's deficient and inefficient policies violated state and
federal statutes mandating such services.45 The Third Circuit held
that the lower court abused its discretion when it denied class certi-
fication, because by forcing plaintiffs to bring individual claims,
"the [lower] court failed to give effect to the proper role of (b)(2)
class actions in remedying systemic violations of basic rights .... 46
According to the court, fixing an individual plaintiff's situation
would mean little when that child "faces the immediate threat of
losing" her remedial services in a system "characterized by the
widespread absence of such services."47 Moreover, resolving an in-
dividual plaintiff's grievances would be inadequate where "each
[child in state custody] potentially face[s] all of the system's
deficiencies. "48
The fourth effect of class action restrictions is that they selec-
tively wrest control of the proceedings away from judges. In the
traditional function of the courts, the judge, responding to a re-
quest from either side, determines whether parties must proceed
by class action or by separate or consolidated individual actions.49
Class action restrictions prevent one side from presenting the court
with such a request and therefore often prevent the court from
making such a determination. This is a particular problem when a
class action is the most effective way for a case to proceed. For
example, class actions are often the most effective way for courts to
hear and address concerns about adverse conditions in adult homes
or the adverse treatment of migrant workers by employers. This is
the particular administrative officials with whom the client has dealt
personally.
Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group
Representation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 18 (1984); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Access to
Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1803 (2001) ("[I]t is usually advantageous for
plaintiffs with similar claims to pursue them as class actions, since such collective ef-
forts offer broader relief . . ").
44. Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 52 (3d Cir. 1994).
45. Id. at 53.
46. Id. at 64.
47. Id. at 63.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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due to the fact that many of the individuals harmed by such prac-
tices rely on the defendants for their basic needs and are afraid to
participate in individual cases because of the threat of retaliation.5 °
Judges who hear individual adult home or migrant worker cases
brought by a lawyer subject to a class action restriction are una-
ware of the need for a class action and never hear the motion that
would, absent the restriction, prompt the case's conversion into a
class action.
Finally, class action restrictions selectively cause cases to disap-
pear before they can be resolved by the courts, as defendants rely
on the restrictions to insulate themselves from litigation.51 For ex-
ample, MFY Legal Services, Inc. has found that when it represents
mentally disabled people alleging that the MTA is unlawfully fail-
ing to grant reduced fares to mentally disabled subway riders,52 the
MTA provides relief to individuals who complain, while continuing
to discriminate against similarly situated people. This permits the
50. See Decl. of Jeanette Zelhof dated Dec. 6, 2001, 9, Dobbins v. Legal Servs.
Corp., No. 01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001) (on file with the authors);
Decl. of James Schmidt dated Nov. 15, 2001, 41, Dobbins v. Legal Servs. Corp., No.
01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001) (on file with the authors).
51. Chip Gray, Executive Director of South Brooklyn Legal Services, an LSC
grantee, has described the importance of class actions in subjecting government agen-
cies to judicial review:
Among South Brooklyn's more notable achievements was litigation compel-
ling the New York City Board of Education to provide adequate educational
opportunities to students with disabilities. The Jose P. v Ambach case re-
sulted in a consent decree dramatically broadening the educational opportu-
nities available to the disabled. The litigation is particularly relevant to this
motion because the use of the class action mechanism was crucial to the
result. Previous efforts to seek judicial review of the widespread denial of
needed services to students with disabilities had been mooted when the de-
fendants provided relief to the individuals who complained without chang-
ing their overall practices. In my experience, it is not uncommon for
government agencies to try to insulate a policy or practice from judicial re-
view by granting individual relief in an effort to moot the more general chal-
lenge. In those situations, a class action is advantageous, not merely to
provide efficient and effective relief to similarly situated plaintiffs, but also
to preserve the jurisdiction of the court.
Decl. of John C. Gray dated Nov. 29, 2001, 7, Dobbins v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 01
Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001). Marie A. Failinger and Larry May concur:
[U]nlike the class suit, the individual suit will often be rendered moot if the
welfare official grants the client the minimal benefit to which he or she was
entitled if the suit were successful. But, as often happens, a month or two
later the same official may vindictively deny the benefits again, perhaps in
retaliation for the lawsuit.
Failinger & May, supra note 43, at 17; see also Braveman, supra note 34, at 68-73
(noting the importance of the class action device in ensuring that litigants' claims are
fully litigated and not mooted out by a defendant).
52. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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MTA to avoid judicial review of its policies and practices while
continuing to violate the law.53 Were MFY able to bring a class
action, the MTA could not avoid judicial review in this manner.
B. Bans on Attorneys' Fee Awards
The federal restriction on awarding attorneys' fees prevents both
state and federal courts from establishing economic incentives
needed for their efficient operation. When LSC grantees appear in
court, the judge is robbed of the ability to use one of the most
effective tools for governing the behavior of counsel and litigants -
awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 4 Opposing coun-
sel sometimes make a point of confirming, during the course of
litigation, that clients represented by LSC grantees cannot seek a
fee award.55 Thus, in cases involving LSC grantees, opposing coun-
sel are well aware that the courts have reduced power to control
the proceedings and deter future unlawful behavior.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the effect of the attor-
neys' fee restriction on the power of the courts is the inability of
courts to use their inherent authority to award attorneys' fees to
punish disobedience of their orders and other improper behavior
during the litigation of a case.56 Ordinarily, federal courts and at
least some state courts have the "inherent authority ... to assess
attorney's fees when a party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.' ,,57 The imposition of sanc-
tions in such a case stems from "a court's inherent power to police
itself" and serves to "'vindicat[e] judicial authority."' 58 Federal
53. Decl. of David F. Dobbins dated Dec. 5, 2001, para. 5, Dobbins v. Legal Servs.
Corp., No. 01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001).
54. See A.G. Ship Maint. Corp. v. Lezak, 503 N.E.2d 681, 682 (N.Y. 1986) (dis-
cussing the effectiveness of awarding attorneys' fees).
55. See Decl. of Jeanette Zelhof dated Dec. 6, 2001, para. 15, Dobbins v. Legal
Servs. Corp., No. 01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001).
56. Although the federal attorneys' fee award restriction does not prevent LSC
grantees from claiming fees pursuant to court practice rules such as Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11, see supra note 14, it apparently does prevent them from claiming
fees awarded pursuant to the inherent power of the courts and fees awarded pursuant
to civil contempt statutes. See LINDA E. PERLE & ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, THE CLASP
GUIDE TO PARTS 1609 AND 1642 FEE-GENERATING CASES AND ATToRNEYS' FEES 29
(1998) ("Civil contempt imposed on a party for failure to pay court ordered child
support or to abide by the terms of an injunction would not be considered to be
sanctions for the purpose of this rule, and recipients would not be permitted to seek
attorneys' fees."). See also LSC Office of Legal Affairs, External Op. 2001-1007
(2001).
57. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653 (1992) (quoting Chambers v.
Nasco, Inc., 500 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991)).
58. Id. (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1979)).
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and state courts also have the inherent authority to punish civil
contempt by awarding attorneys' fees. One purpose of civil con-
tempt orders is to ensure that courts' orders are respected, thus
safeguarding the power of the courts.59 As a result of the federal
attorneys' fee restriction, however, courts cannot award fees to
parties represented by LSC grantees, thus substantially reducing
the courts' ability to protect their own authority.
Another effect of the attorneys' fee restriction is that courts have
a diminished ability to prevent themselves from being used for ille-
gitimate ends. For instance, the New York legislature has deter-
mined that landlords often use the courts to intimidate tenants into
leaving premises that the tenants lawfully possess.6" The landlords
require their tenants to sign a form lease obligating the tenant to
pay the landlord's attorneys' fees in cases arising from the tenant's
failure to comply with the lease. The form does not contain a re-
ciprocal provision providing for the landlord to pay the tenant's
attorneys' fees in cases arising from the landlord's failure to com-
ply with the lease. 61 This leaves landlords with an incentive to
bring meritless litigation against the tenants, and it leaves many
tenants without the bargaining power or resources to enforce their
rights in court. In order to empower the courts to remedy this situ-
ation, the New York legislature has empowered courts to order
landlords to pay tenants' legal expenses in cases arising out of the
landlord's violation of the lease or the landlord's commencement
of an unsuccessful action against the tenant.62 The law "discour-
age[s] landlords from engaging in frivolous litigation in an effort to
harass tenants, particularly tenants without the resources to resist
legal action, into terminating legal occupancy. '63  The law also
"provides an incentive to resolve disputes quickly and without un-
due expense" on the part of the court and litigants.64
59. See In re Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev't v. DEKA Realty Corp., 620 N.Y.S.2d
837, 840 (App. Div. 1987) (noting that one purpose of a civil contempt penalty is "'to
coerce compliance with the court's mandate"' (quoting In re Dep't. of Envtl. Protect.
v. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 70 N.Y.2d 233, 239 (1987)); see also supra note 2.
60. See Maplewood Mngmt. v. Best, 533 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (App. Div. 1988).
61. See Jocar v. Galas, 673 N.Y.S.2d 836, 839 (City Civ. Ct. 1998).
62. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 234 (McKinney 2001).
63. Duell v. Condon, 647 N.E.2d 96, 98 (N.Y. 1995). See also Maplewood Mngmt.,
533 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
64. Duell, 647 N.E.2d at 98. The United States Supreme Court has recognized
that in civil rights cases a defendant's potential liability for attorneys' fees is often an
important bargaining chip encouraging settlement of meritorious lawsuits. See Evans
v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 731-34 (1986). This is equally true in landlord-tenant and
other litigation in which fee awards are available. In this way, attorneys' fee awards
help reduce the burden on the courts of needlessly long litigation.
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When tenants are represented by LSC grantees, however, the
courts do not have this important tool. The tenants - by definition
the sort of low-income litigants the legislature sought to protect -
are forced to defend themselves in housing court knowing that if
the landlord's claims are successful they will be forced to pay his
attorneys' fees and that if their own claims are successful the land-
lord will have no such obligation.65 The landlords are free to bring
repeated meritless litigation, and the courts can do little about it.66
In fact, in one case in which MIFY Legal Services, Inc. represented
a wrongfully evicted tenant, the judge warned the landlord, who
conceded that the tenant was entitled to reoccupy the apartment,
that if he wasted judicial time by proceeding to trial on the remain-
ing subsidiary issues he would be liable for the tenant's attorneys'
fees. 67 The MIFY Legal Services, Inc. attorney was forced to state
that her client could not claim a fee award. The resolution of the
case was consequently delayed, which likely would not have been
the case had the client been able to claim a fee award.68 Congress
has thus placed the state courts at the mercy of landlords, who have
no incentive not to bring meritless claims or to unnecessarily delay
litigation and who are free to use the courts to scare tenants repre-
sented by LSC grantees into giving up possession of their homes.69
It is not only in housing cases that the attorneys' fee restriction
causes this sort of damage. In the day care reimbursement case
brought by LSC grantee South Brooklyn Legal Services,70 the re-
65. This effect of the attorneys' fee restriction is not limited to New York. Robert
Sable, the Executive Director of Greater Boston Legal Services, reports that his hous-
ing attorneys "felt and feel that [attorneys' fee awards are] important leverage in ne-
gotiating with landlords." Equal Justice and Reconfiguration in Massachusetts: A
Dialogue, MGMT. INFO. EXCHANGE J., Fall 2000, at 40, 44. He says that when the
clinical faculty at Boston College Law School operated under the federal attorneys'
fee restriction, "[t]hey felt terribly constrained" as a result. Id.
66. See Decl. of Peggy Earisman dated Nov. 16, 2001, paras. 15, 16, Dobbins v.
Legal Servs. Corp., No. 01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001) (on file with
authors).
67. Decl. of Peggy Earisman dated Nov. 16, 2001, para. 15, Dobbins v. Legal
Servs. Corp., No. 01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001).
68. Id.
69. See id. paras. 15, 16. The problem is not limited to New York. A client of LSC
grantee Florida Rural Legal Services, successfully fought off two attempts to evict
her. Because Florida Rural Legal Services represented her in both cases, she was
unable to claim an attorneys' fee award either time to deter the landlord from contin-
uing to attempt to evict her. When the landlord tried to evict her a third time, Florida
Rural Legal Services had no attorney available to represent her, she proceeded pro
se, and this time she was evicted. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RESTRICTING LEGAL
SERVICES, supra note 3, at 14-15.
70. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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striction deprived South Brooklyn Legal Services of the ability to
claim attorneys' fees. As a result, there were no mounting fees to
serve as an incentive for the agency to dispose of the matter
promptly.7'
Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP suits) are
another type of case in which Congress, through the attorneys' fee
award restriction, has left courts powerless to control impermissi-
ble behavior by litigants and counsel. In such cases, litigants use
the judicial system to prevent citizens from exercising their rights
in a public arena, such as a court or licensing body. In a classic
SLAPP suit a developer might sue an environmentalist who has
opposed the developer's application for a building permit.72
SLAPP lawsuits use the judicial process to wear down an opponent
by using up as much of the opponent's resources as possible.73
SLAPP suits also use up important judicial resources, and by using
the judicial system for improper purposes they bring it into disre-
pute. As one New York court has warned, "[T]he judiciary is as
much a victim" of SLAPP suits as the litigants are.7 4
In order to combat litigants' improper use of the courts in this
way, the New York legislature has passed a law empowering the
courts to award attorneys' fees to people victimized by SLAPP
suits. 75 However, if an LSC grantee is representing a client who is
then hit with a SLAPP suit, the lawyer could not represent the cli-
ent in seeking an attorneys' fee award against the SLAPP suit initi-
ator. This could happen, for example, if a lawyer brings a claim on
behalf of low-wage workers against an employer who violated the
workers' wage and hour rights, and the employer asserts a SLAPP
counterclaim alleging that the worker had tortiously interfered
with his business relationships, 76 or if a lawyer represents individu-
als in a complaint to a government body against a nursing home
that then files a SLAPP counterclaim.77 Since an attorneys' fee
71. See Deci. of John C. Gray dated Nov. 29, 2001, para. 17, Dobbins v. Legal
Servs. Corp., No. 01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001).
72. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3403 cmt. C3403.3 (McKinney 1992).
73. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
74. Id. at 654.
75. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 70-a, 76-a (Consol. 2001).
76. See, e.g., Street Beat Sportswear, Inc. v. Nat'l Mobilization Against Sweat-
shops, 698 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
77. See, e.g., Long Island Ass'n for AIDS Care v. Greene, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 7, 1997,
at 28, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (citing Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v.
Wells, 839 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1988)). Additionally, an employee of LSC grantee MFY
Legal Services, Inc. has been the target of a SLAPP suit brought by the operator of a
nursing home. The SLAPP claim was brought as a separate lawsuit, not as a counter-
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award and costs are the only financial penalties that can be im-
posed on the SLAPP violator if the SLAPP suit does not satisfy the
criteria for the imposition of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages,78 the court may be powerless to take action against the
SLAPP violator. Litigants will then remain free to bring SLAPP
claims against anyone represented by LSC grantees.
In addition to reducing judges' ability to control the behavior of
litigants and lawyers in the courts, the attorneys' fee award restric-
tion also reduces the ability of judges to deter unlawful out-of-
court conduct by the parties before them and by others.79 This is of
particular importance in cases where the damages are negligible -
unless there is a potential attorneys' fee award in such cases, it is
less expensive for wrongdoers to litigate against the rare victim
who goes to court than to cease the wrongdoing.8 0 The result is
that courts continue to be burdened by subsequent cases involving
the same or similar unlawful actions.
C. Impact of Federal Restrictions on Non-Federal Funding
Federal restrictions on the use of non-LSC funds interfere with
the ability of state and local governments, including court systems,
to provide funds to LSC grantees in an effort to improve the effi-
ciency and fairness of state and local government institutions. LSC
grantees often receive significant financial support from state and
local governments. In 1999, for example, LSC grantees received
approximately $307 million from LSC, $88 million from state and
local governments, and $68 million from state-managed IOLTA
programs.8'
claim, and the employee was successfully defended by pro bono counsel who could
obtain an attorneys' fee award. Telephone interview with Jeanette Zelhof, Managing
Attorney at MFY Legal Services, Inc. (Jan. 8, 2002).
78. N.Y. Civ. RIGH-s LAW §§ 70-a(1)(b), 76-a(2) (Consol. 2001).
79. See Rhode, supra note 43, at 1797 (noting that the inability of LSC grantees to
collect attorneys' fee awards "removes an effective deterrent to future abuses");
Rosche et al., supra note 37, at 330 (according to former Bronx Legal Services lawyer
Lucy Billings, "The restriction against attorneys' fees is perhaps the most onerous
restriction," in part because "they are a powerful incentive for our clients' adversaries
to discontinue their illegal conduct in the future").
80. For example, in the reduced subway fare case involving MFY Legal Services,
Inc. and a pro bono attorney, see supra note 35 and accompanying text, the inability
of MFY Legal Services, Inc. to seek an attorneys' fee award undermines the plaintiffs'
ability to deter the MTA from continuing to engage in its allegedly wrongful conduct.
Decl. of David F. Dobbins dated Dec. 5, 2001, para. 36, Dobbins v. Legal Servs.
Corp., No. 01 Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001).
81. See LSC, 1999 ACTUAL REVENUE REPORT 1 (1999) (on file with the authors).
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State courts play an important role in generating this funding
through state court filing fees and fines. 2 Additionally, state court
judges play an important role in administering IOLTA funds.83
Decisions of state and local governments to commit substantial
resources to legal services are premised on an understanding that
state and local governments function more efficiently and fairly
when the poor have effective legal representation. As the Supreme
Court observed in Velazquez, "An informed, independent judiciary
presumes an informed, independent bar. '84 Acting on the same
premise, state and local governments allocate funds for legal ser-
vices to ensure that state and local judges will have the benefit of
argument by counsel even when the litigants are too poor to afford
counsel. The New York legislature, for instance, established the
New York IOLA Fund because "the availability of civil legal ser-
vices to poor persons is essential to the due administration of
justice. 85
The LSC restrictions diminish the ability of state and local gov-
ernments to improve the performance of the courts. As a result of
the 1996 LSC appropriations act and the "program integrity" re-
striction, state and local efforts to aid LSC grantees are either en-
cumbered by the 1996 restrictions or expended on wasteful
attempts to establish and maintain burdensome separate entities.86
82. See ABA, PROJECT TO EXPAND RESOURCES FOR LEGAL SERVICES, A CHART
OF SIGNIFICANT FUNDRAISING ACTIVITIES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (2000) (showing ap-
proximately $36.8 million dollars in court filing fees and fines generated annually for
civil legal services nationwide), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
sclaidbody.html.
83. See, e.g., 2000 TEX. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUND. ANNUAL REP. (2000)
(two state court justices sit on the board of Texas IOLTA), available at http://
www.txiolta.org/2000annual.pdf.; ARK. IOLTA FOUND., OFFICERS, DIRECTORS AND
STAFF (2002) (listing the Treasurer of the Arkansas Administrative Office of the
Courts as a director of the Arkansas IOLTA Foundation serving as the designee of
the Chief Justice of the state), at http://courts.state.ar.us/iolta/directors.html; CONN.
BAR FOUND., BOARD OF DIRECTORS (2002) (two state court justices serve on the
Connecticut Bar Foundation Board of Directors, which awards IOLTA grants), at
http://www.ctbar.org/public/cbf/page9.shtml; FLA. BAR FOUND., BOARD OF DIREC-
TORS (2002) (three state court justices serve as directors of the Florida Bar Founda-
tion, which awards IOLTA grants), at http://www.flabarfndn.org/; IND. PRO BONO
COMM'N (2002) (three state court justices serve as members of the commission
awarding IOLTA grants), at http.//www.state.in.us/judiciary/probono/commis-
sionmembers.html; Ky. IOLTA BD. OF TRS. (a state court justice serves on the
IOLTA Board of Trustees), at http://www.kybar.org/KBFIOLTA/iobd.htm.
84. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 545.
85. N.Y. FIN. LAW § 97-v note (McKinney 2001) (Historical & Statutory Notes)
(quoting 1983 N.Y. LAws 659, § 1).
86. State and local governments can also avoid having their legal services funding
subjected to the LSC restrictions by giving their funding only to programs that do not
ADVOCACY FOR THE POOR
If state and local grants are subjected to the congressional ban
on delivering "restricted" legal services, state-funded lawyers will
be hampered in their ability to provide representation in some
cases.87 For example, states often fund legal services lawyers in or-
der to educate members of particular communities about their le-
gal rights and then to represent indigent persons whose rights have
been violated.88 The 1996 restrictions, however, prevent the states
from funding lawyers to "represent[ ] a client as a result of in-per-
son unsolicited advice" if those lawyers receive any LSC funding.89
Similarly, states often fund legal services attorneys to engage in the
categories of representation in which LSC grantees are prohibited
from engaging.90 Michigan, for example, allocates some of its state
funding specifically to provide legal services to migrant agricultural
workers. 91 This goal is made significantly more difficult by the re-
quirement that the money be subjected to the federal restriction on
providing assistance to certain categories of aliens,92 given to a
non-LSC program, or used to establish and maintain an objectively
and physically separate program that receives no LSC funding.
If state and local governments seek to establish an "objectively"
separate legal program in a separate physical facility to deliver the
otherwise "restricted" legal services, they will be forced to waste
receive any LSC funding. However, there are often compelling reasons to fund LSC
grantees. For example, some LSC grantees have particular expertise or ties to their
communities that other lawyers in the area cannot provide.
87, See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. pts. 1617, 1626, 1637, 1638 and 1642 (2001) (barring attor-
neys employed by LSC grantees from representing prisoners and certain aliens; claim-
ing, or collecting and retaining, court-ordered attorneys' fee awards; participating in
class actions; and conducting outreach to potential clients).
88. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERVS. LAW § 50 (McKinney 2001) (mandating the use of
funding for, among other things, "outreach, and provision of services," including legal
services, to prevent homelessness); id. § 459-c (mandating the use of funding for,
among other things, "community education and outreach activities" and "advocacy"
for domestic violence victims).
89. 45 C.F.R. § 1638.3 (1996).
90. For example, Velazquez plaintiff Farmworker Legal Services of New York ap-
plied for and received a grant from New York IOLA specifically to engage in the
categories of work that LSC grantees in New York State are unable to handle. Decl.
of James Schmidt dated Nov. 15, 2001, 25, Dobbins v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 01
Civ. 08371 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001) (on file with the authors). Lorna Blake,
Executive Director of the IOLA Fund of the State of New York has noted that in
1995, LSC grantees received seventy-five percent of all New York IOLA funding.
Lorna K. Blake, The IOLA Fund and LSC Restrictions, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
455, 456 (1998). The New York IOLA Board of Trustees determined that the federal
restrictions imposed on LSC grantees in 1996 "conflicted with the Fund's statutory
mandate and its mission to support a full array of legal services." Id.
91. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.1485(8)(c) (West 1996).
92. See supra note 87.
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scarce resources, shoulder difficult administrative burdens, and ac-
cept a programmatically undesirable structure.93 By forcing state or
local government funds to be expended to establish and maintain a
separate entity that receives no federal funding, the program integ-
rity regulation causes a significant portion of the funds to be
wasted on duplicative administration and overhead costs, frustrat-
ing the government's interest in ensuring that its legal services
funding is used in the most economically efficient manner.94
Thus, whether court systems act as legal services funders (by al-
locating court fees and fines for legal services), or whether they are
an intended beneficiary of funding allocated to legal services law-
yers by other branches of state government, the imposition of fed-
eral restrictions on state legal services funding disadvantages state
court systems.
D. Bans on Representing Particular Categories of Persons or
Persons With Particular Categories of Legal Claims
At a time when courts around the nation have expressed concern
about the problems posed by pro se litigants,95 some judges have
93. For a description of the burdens faced by some LSC grantees who have estab-
lished affiliate relationships with entities that receive no LSC funding, see David S.
Udell, The Legal Services Restrictions: Lawyers in Florida, New York, Oregon and
Virginia Describe the Costs, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 337 (1998). The complete
administrative, financial and programmatic burdens of operating two separate pro-
grams functioning in separate physical locations are too numerous to fully catalogue
here. However, in the context of a separate effort to compel LSC grantees to consoli-
date into larger programs, LSC has warned that operating multiple smaller programs
instead of one larger program can interfere with the ability of the programs to recruit
qualified lawyers and paralegals; to train, supervise and mentor new lawyers; to de-
velop attorney expertise; to make themselves accessible to clients; and to obtain and
use technology. See Letter from Cynthia G. Schneider, LSC Program Counsel, to
Gretchen Coll-Marti, Executive Director, Puerto Rico Legal Services, Inc. et al. 5(Aug. 31, 2000), available at http://www.rin.lsc.gov/rinboard/ReviewSP/prfd.htm.; Let-
ter from Willie Abrams, LSC Program Counsel, to Janet B. Dyer, Executive Director,
Western Arkansas Legal Services et al. 9 (June 13, 2000), available at http://
www.rin.lsc.gov/rinboardReviewSP/ARfd.htm.
94. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERVS. LAW § 50 (McKinney 2001) (expressing a desire "to
maximize the effect of state funds" spent on homelessness prevention legal services);
N.Y. FIN. LAW § 97-v (2001) (stating that the New York IOLA fund is intended "to
provide stable, economical and high quality delivery of civil legal services to the
poor").
95. See, e.g., CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, POSITION PAPER ON SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGATION (2000); JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHAL-
LENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND
COURT MANAGERS (1998) (on file with the authors); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CA., AD-
MIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ASSISTING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: REGIONAL
CONFERENCES 2001 (2001).
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expressed alarm about rules that wipe out representation for whole
categories of litigants and, at least in some instances, add to the
burden on judges.96 For instance, a task force on access to justice
acting under the auspices of the Alaska Supreme Court polled five
Alaska Superior Court judges about the effects of the federal re-
strictions on LSC grantees.97 The judges reported that they had
seen an increase in the number of pro se litigants in their court-
rooms, and that the judges had to spend more time on those
cases. 98 This affected other participants in the justice system be-
cause the judges were often placed in the uncomfortable and possi-
bly inappropriate position of acting as mediator or attorney for the
pro se litigants; the judges had to postpone more complex cases;
and attorneys opposing pro se litigants with a poor understanding
of the legal process had to return to court repeatedly. 99 The judges
also believed that the legal system as a whole was undermined be-
cause pro se litigants were often unable to effectively assert their
rights, while litigants who could afford counsel were generally able
to do so.100
In addition to increasing pro se representation, restrictions that
disallow representation for entire categories of clients or legal
claims make low-income people vulnerable to exploitation as they
seek legal representation from the private bar. For example, by
forcing indigent immigrants to turn away from the legal services
bar in favor of the private bar, the federal restriction on represen-
tation of aliens encourages those immigrants to rely on work by
lawyers who are not well compensated and therefore, in some in-
stances, are likely to perform sub par work.10' Judges' frustrations
with low rates of compensation for lawyers are well known. °2
96. These include the federal restrictions preventing LSC grantees from represent-
ing certain types of clients, such as certain immigrants and prisoners, and from repre-
senting people in certain types of claims, such as abortion-related litigation and
evictions of public housing tenants who are accused of drug-related crimes. See supra
notes 15-16 and accompanying text. These also include similar restrictions on state
and local funding. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
97. See ALASKA ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE TASK FORCE, supra note 26, at 12.
98. Id. at 12-13.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 11-12.
101. We do not here suggest that lawyers who charge a low fee will necessarily do
poor work-indeed, many such lawyers should be applauded for their altruism - but
rather note the systemic problem created when legal representatives are not ade-
quately compensated.
102. See, e.g., In re Nicholson, No. 00-CV-2229, 2001 WL 1661707, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 21, 2001) (noting "the overwhelming consensus of New York state officials, judi-
cial officers, legal experts, and published opinions as well as the evidence that the
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Courts are further burdened by rules that, in eliminating legal
services for certain categories of low-income people who often
have claims against certain institutions, inherently increase the lev-
erage of those institutions in cases that do reach the courts. Judges
may find that "repeat players" - such institutional litigants as pub-
lic housing authorities, the federal Immigration and Naturalization
Service, and various federal and state prison systems - have an
unfortunate advantage in litigation when few cases against them
ever reach the courts,1 °3 or when those that do reach the courts
involve the institution against a pro se party. Apart from the bur-
den on the courts of protecting the rights of any single pro se liti-
gant, the courts must also be concerned about whether institutional
litigants who rarely, if ever, face opposition from represented liti-
gants, can be relied on to make accurate representations to the
court.
Courts should also be aware of whole categories of individuals
who remain out of court, never advancing their claims. For exam-
ple, courts hearing the rare prison abuse case in which a prisoner is
represented by skilled counsel cannot help but wonder if the case is
indicative of a much larger problem that will never come before
any court. Courts should do everything they can to enable immi-
grants, prisoners, and others to obtain their day in court. Other-
wise, judges will face a deepening public perception that courts are
inherently unfair because the most victimized people in the society
are unable to obtain access.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM IMPLICATIONS
OF THE IMPACT OF LEGAL SERVICES RESTRICTIONS
ON JUDGES
Restrictions on legal representation for the poor raise profound
legal concerns, including concerns under the First, Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. These concerns
relate to the principles of separation of powers and federalism em-
bodied in that document and the ethical regimes under which at-
current statutory rates do not permit [assigned] lawyers to provide competent repre-
sentation to their clients, and that as a result mothers are consistently denied their
constitutional rights").
103. Leti Volpp has argued that institutional litigants such as the Immigration and
Naturalization Service have a similar advantage when they cannot be subjected to
class actions. See Leti Volpp, Court-Stripping and Class-Wide Relief A Response to
Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 463, 470(2000).
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torneys practice.1 °4 This article discusses some separation of
104. This article does not attempt an exhaustive exploration of the myriad legal
problems that legal services restrictions cause for clients, lawyers, courts, and other
affected people and institutions. Other articles have discussed the First and Four-
teenth Amendment implications of the 1996 federal restrictions. See, e.g., Ass'n of
the Bar of City of N.Y., Comms. on Civil Rights & Prof'l Responsibility, A Call for
the Repeal or Invalidation of Congressional Restrictions on Legal Services Lawyers, 53
THE RECORD 13, 32-54 (1998); Matthew Diller et al., Symposium: Constitutional Is-
sues Panel, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 345 (1998); Rhode, supra note 43, at 1802-04;
Jessica A. Roth, It Is Lawyers We Are Funding: A Constitutional Challenge to the 1996
Restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1630
(1998); David S. Udell, Implications of the Legal Services Struggle for Other Govern-
ment Grants for Lawyering for the Poor, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895 (1998); J. Dwight
Yoder, Justice or Injustice for the Poor? A Look at the Constitutionality of Congres-
sional Restrictions on Legal Services, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 827 (1998); Note,
Recent Legislation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1346, 1348-49 (1997).
Several commentators have briefly discussed the separation of powers or court-
stripping nature of the 1996 federal restrictions. See, e.g., Stephan 0. Kline, Judicial
Independence: Rebuffing Congressional Attacks on the Third Branch, 87 Ky. L.J. 679,
730-32 (1999); Catherine G. Patsos, The Constitutionality and Implications of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 205 (1998); Nadine Strossen,
The Current Assault on Constitutional Rights and Civil Liberties: Origins and Ap-
proaches, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 769 (1997); Jonathan A. Weiss, Should the Government
Fund Legal Services? If So, What Should the Lawyers Do?, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY
LEGAL ETHICs 401, 408 (1999).
Numerous commentators have discussed ethical problems caused by legal services
restrictions. See, e.g., Ass'n of the Bar of City of N.Y., Comms. on Civil Rights &
Prof'l Responsibility, supra, at 54-59; Recommendations of the Conference on the De-
livery of Legal Services to Low-Income Persons, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1751 (1999);
Alan W. Houseman, Restrictions by Funders and the Ethical Practice of Law, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 2187 (1999); Samuel J. Levine, Legal Services Lawyers and the
Influence of Third Parties on the Lawyer-Client Relationship: Some Thoughts from
Scholars, Practitioners, and Courts, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2319 (1999); Russell G.
Pearce et al., Ethical Issues Panel, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 357 (1998); Rosche et al.,
supra note 37; Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional Regulation, and
the Anti-Interference Principle in Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1469, 1514-21 (2000);
Udell, supra note 93; Weiss, supra note 104.
Some commentators have warned that the imposition of legal services restrictions,
standing alone or combined with grossly inadequate funding for legal services, may
make it more urgent for courts to examine the extent to which due process requires a
right to counsel in civil cases. See, e.g., Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to
Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United States and Other Industrial Democ-
racies, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 83, 102 (2000) ("The existing restrictions in the Legal
Services Corporation Act are enough in themselves to establish an urgent need for a
judicially protected right."); Hon. Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a
Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 503 (1998) (arguing that a civil Gideon is
necessary to help "courts maintain the confidence of the society and to perform the
task of insuring that we are a just society operating under a rule of law." This is
especially true because most indigent people do not have access to lawyers, in part as
a result of the 1996 federal restrictions.).
Finally, the constitutional issues raised by state legal services restrictions have
rarely, if ever, been explored. Potential issues, too numerous to thoroughly discuss
here, include the right to travel implications of restrictions on legal services for mi-
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powers and federalism implications of the federal restrictions, as
these are the doctrines that most directly affect judicial power. 10 5
A. Separation of Powers and Federalism Implications
Under Velazquez
In Velazquez, the Supreme Court articulated a framework for
understanding if governmental restrictions on legal services law-
yers violate the separation of powers. The Velazquez Court invali-
dated a federal restriction banning LSC grantees from arguing, on
behalf of their clients, that welfare reform statutes or regulations
were unconstitutional or contrary to the governing law. 1 6 The
Court reasoned that bans on lawyers' speech that "distort" the ju-
diciary's ability to receive information needed to perform the judi-
cial function violate both the First Amendment and principles of
separation of powers. 10 7 The Court held that the prohibition
before it warped the exercise of the judicial function by preventing
LSC grantees from advancing valid legal arguments, thus depriving
courts of information relevant to their determinations:
Restricting LSC attorneys in advising their clients and in
presenting arguments and analyses to the courts distorts the le-
gal system by altering the traditional role of the attorneys in
much the same -way broadcast systems or student publication
networks were changed in the limited forum cases we have
cited. Just as government in those cases could not elect to use a
broadcasting network or a college publication structure in a re-
gime which prohibits speech necessary to the proper functioning
of those systems,... it may not design a subsidy to effect this
serious and fundamental restriction on advocacy of attorneys
and the functioning of the judiciary.1"8
grant workers and the First Amendment implications of state restrictions that prohibit
the use of state funding for lawsuits against the state.
105. Although the separation of powers and federalism doctrines embodied in the
federal Constitution limit only the actions of the federal government, state legal ser-
vices restrictions may fall afoul of the separation of powers principles embodied in
state constitutions.
106. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
107. Id. at 544-45. It is well established that the First Amendment protects the
rights of public interest lawyers and their clients to associate for the purpose of pro-
viding and receiving free legal representation. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
108. Velazquez 531 U.S., at 546 (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666 (1998); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819 (1995)).
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In Velazquez, the Court's holding ultimately rested on a recogni-
tion that the opportunity to advance all relevant legal arguments is
essential to the proper functioning of the judiciary. 10 9 The Court
relied on the separation of powers doctrine to support its finding
that the basic function of the courts is to hear such arguments:
The restriction imposed by the statute here threatens severe im-
pairment of the judicial function. [The restriction] sifts out cases
presenting constitutional challenges in order to insulate the
Government's laws from judicial inquiry. If the restriction on
speech and legal advice were to stand, the result would be two
tiers of cases. In cases where LSC counsel were attorneys of
record, there would be lingering doubt whether the truncated
representation had resulted in complete analysis of the case, full
advice to the client, and proper presentation to the court. The
courts and the public would come to question the adequacy and
fairness of professional representations when the attorney, ei-
ther consciously to comply with this statute or unconsciously to
continue the representation despite the statute, avoided all ref-
erence to questions of statutory validity and constitutional au-
thority. A scheme so inconsistent with accepted separation of
powers principles is an insufficient basis to sustain or uphold the
restriction on speech." 0
Although it only made explicit mention of separation of powers
principles, the Court effectively overturned the welfare challenge
restriction with respect to proceedings in both federal and state
courts."' Implicit in the Court's opinion is a recognition that since
Congress lacks the power to warp the proceedings in federal
courts, it cannot, consistent with established principles of federal-
ism, have the power to warp the proceedings in state courts. The
Supreme Court has held that "It is incontestible that the Constitu-
tion established a system of 'dual sovereignty,' "112 in which the
states "retain [ ] 'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.' ' '91 3
Within this system, the federal government has the power in enu-
merated settings to regulate private behavior, but the federal gov-
ernment is without power to direct a state's exercise of sovereign
109. Id. at 545.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 548-49.
112. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)).
113. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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functions.114 As the Supreme Court has warned, Congress cannot
"intrude on state governmental functions.' '1 15
Federal interference with state control over the proper function-
ing of state court systems clearly implicates the tenets of federal-
ism. The Supreme Court has, for example, ruled that a federal
attempt to curtail a state's authority over who can serve as a state
court judge would pose "a constitutional problem," because a
state's choice of the qualifications of its state court judges "is a
decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity." '16 It
has also held that state sovereignty is affected when federal courts
intervene in state courts' exercise of disciplinary authority over
lawyers practicing in state court." 7 Finally, although a state court
adjudicating federal rights must apply federal procedures that form
part of the substance of those rights," 8 at all other times control
over the procedures is under the sole control of the states." 9
Restrictions such as those on participating in class actions or
claiming an attorneys' fee award are especially likely to raise sepa-
ration of powers and similar federalism concerns. Restrictions on
class actions interfere with the ability of courts to ensure that low-
income people learn about and benefit from court-ordered reme-
dies; selectively interfere with the ability of courts to rule on a com-
plete record; selectively interfere with the ability of courts to
determine whether a case should proceed as a class action; and se-
lectively cause cases to disappear before they can be resolved by
114. Id. at 935. ("The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring
the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers . . . to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program."); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot "require the States to govern
according to Congress' instructions").
115. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470.
116. Id. at 460, 464.
117. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (warning that federal courts
should not "intrude into the state's proper authority to define and apply the standards
of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in its courts"); see also
Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1210 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying Younger abstention
to a case challenging a New York court's ethics decision, because "if a state court
were subject to the supervisory intervention of a federal overseer at the threshold of
the court's initiation of a disciplinary proceeding against its own officer, the state judi-
ciary might suffer an unfair and unnecessary blow to its integrity and effectiveness").
118. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
119. See Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158
(1931) (holding that "the procedure by which rights may be enforced and wrongs
remedied is peculiarly a subject of state regulation and control"); Mondou v. New
York, 223 U.S. 1, 56 (1912) (noting that Congress did not attempt in the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act "to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts or to
control or affect their modes of procedure").
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the courts. The federal attorneys' fee restriction deprives courts of
the abilities to prevent themselves from being used for illegitimate
ends; ensure that litigants and counsel do not unduly delay the pro-
ceedings; and ensure that their rulings have the maximum deter-
rent effect. 2 °
Both restrictions cast doubt on the reliability of some federal
and state court proceedings in a way that the Velazquez Court has
held is constitutionally unacceptable. The Court warned that the
federal ban on the challenge of welfare laws and regulations by
LSC grantees representing clients in welfare cases "threaten[ed]
severe impairment of the judicial function,"121 by creating one cate-
gory of cases-those in which the lawyers were funded by LSC-
where the fairness of the outcome of the case would be in doubt,
and another category-those in which the lawyers received no LSC
funding-in which the outcome would be reliable. 2 2 The class ac-
tion and attorneys' fee award restrictions likewise cast doubt on
the validity of cases involving LSC grantees, in which the court's
ability to control the proceedings and the outcomes has been com-
promised, while leaving unaffected those in which no LSC grantee
is involved. This is a serious interference with the integrity of the
courts with important separation of powers and federalism
implications.
B. Additional Separation of Powers and Federalism
Implications of Restrictions on Non-Federal Funding
The federal restrictions on LSC grantees pose two additional
federalism concerns. First, by prohibiting courts from certifying
class actions or awarding attorneys' fees in cases involving LSC
grantees, the federal class action and attorneys' fee restrictions in-
terfere with the ability of state governments to control the availa-
bility of these procedures and remedies in state courts. State
governments, including state courts, often find that class actions
and attorneys' fee awards are essential to the administration of
state justice systems. 23 For example, in signing the most recent
amendments to New York's class action statute, which increased
the availability of class actions, then-Governor Carey stated, "By
120. See supra notes 54-80 and accompanying text.
121. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001).
122. Id.
123. The findings of the New York legislature and New York courts regarding the
necessity of attorneys' fee awards to the administration of justice are discussed supra
notes 54, 63-64 and accompanying text.
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permitting common questions of law or fact affecting numerous
persons to be litigated in one forum, the bill would result in greater
conservation of judicial effort.' 1 24 In support of the same amend-
ments the New York Office of Court Administration wrote that a
revised class action statute was necessary because of "pressing
needs for an effective, flexible and balanced group remedy in vital
areas of social concern."' 25 The Office noted that without the
amendments there "exists no workable remedy when neither relief
on an individual basis nor actual joinder of the class is economi-
cally or administratively feasible.' 26 Because the judiciary, the
legislature, and the executive branch have all made clear that they
desire class actions and attorneys' fee awards to be available in
state courts in certain circumstances, the federal government's in-
terference with the availability of class actions and attorneys' fee
awards cases involving LSC grantees has serious federalism
implications.
The second additional federalism concern is that the federal re-
strictions on non-federal funds received by LSC grantees hamper
the ability of state governments, including court systems, to allo-
cate funding to improve the administration of justice in state
courts.2 7 As described above, Congress has prevented states from
financing legal services lawyers to operate effectively in state
courts or to represent certain categories of clients, unless those
lawyers spend a significant portion of the state funding to establish
wasteful and duplicative programs. 2 8 Given the importance of
lawyers to the proper functioning of the courts, 29 the ability of a
state to assure that a state-funded lawyer is free to represent clients
effectively in order to enhance the administration of justice in its
124. Memorandum from Hugh L. Carey, Governor of New York, filed with N.Y.
Assembly Bill No. 1252-B (1975); see also N.Y.C.P.L.R. 901 (2001) (stating a class
action is appropriate if it would be "superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy").
125. See Memorandum from the State of New York, Office of Court Administra-
tion, in support of S-1309 & A-1252, at 1 (1975).
126. See id.
127. Several members of Congress recognized the federalism implications of fed-
eral restrictions on state and local government funding in 1992, when they urged the
rejection on federalism grounds of a predecessor to the 1996 LSC restrictions, which
would have restricted the funding that state and local governments allocated to LSC
grantees. See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. H3115-02, H3115-H3121 (May 12, 1992) (state-
ments of Reps. Frank, Boxer, Lowey, Washington and Norton in opposition to at-
tempt to restrict state and local funding). The measure did not pass in 1992, although
it passed in an altered form in 1996. See supra note 9.
128. See supra notes 9, 11 and accompanying text.
129. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546-48 (2001).
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courts is just as important to a state's sovereignty as are selecting
its judges, regulating attorney ethics, or determining the proce-
dures that attorneys will follow. By forbidding state and local gov-
ernments that fund legal services lawyers from allocating funding
to those lawyers for the purposes that the states deem important to
the functioning of their judiciaries, unless the government wastes
money on a duplicative and burdensome separate entity, Congress
thus intrudes on state sovereignty.
The interference of the federal class action restriction with the
functioning of the federal and state courts is particularly offensive
to principles of separation of powers and federalism because the
class action mechanism arises out of the common law, and both
state and federal courts retain at least some inherent equity power
to certify and control class actions. 130
Likewise, the attorneys' fee award restriction constitutes an un-
acceptable intrusion into the separation of powers and federalism,
because both federal courts and state courts retain the inherent
power to impose attorneys' fee awards on attorneys and parties
who defy court orders, litigate in bad faith, or otherwise abuse the
judicial forum. 31 This power permits both Article III and state
courts to use the attorneys' fee sanction in cases falling outside of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.132 In cases in which an LSC
grantee represents one side, however, the court is powerless to use
its inherent authority to award fees to control the proceedings
before it,133 in violation of both separation of powers and
federalism.
CONCLUSION
We do not suggest that there is any quick fix for the problems
caused by legal services funding restrictions. But for judges con-
130. See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 301-02 (1853) (holding, with-
out reference to the federal procedural rules then in effect, that "where the parties
interested are numerous, and the suit is for an object common to them all, some of the
body may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and of the others"); Kevin M. Forde
et al., State Practice: Illinois' Class Action Statute, ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUC. (Apr. 2001) ("[I1t is the authors' view that the court has the inherent equity
power to certify a mandatory class.").
131. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991); Gordon v. Marrone,
590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653-54 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (discussing the inherent powers of federal
and New York courts to assess attorneys' fees for bad faith litigation). See also supra
note 57 and accompanying text.
132. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46-47; Gordon, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 653-54.
133. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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cerned about doing justice and about operating effective court-
rooms, there are a number of ideas to explore:
1. Judges can track the status of legal services restrictions and
find ways to defend the integrity of their judicial function in cases
where counsel for one side is constrained by funding restrictions.
For example, judges can promote consistent application of court
procedural rules to all counsel if one side is unable to claim attor-
neys' fees and the other side sees that disability as an invitation to
engage in extensive unwarranted motion practice. One approach
would be to sua sponte require offending litigants to pay fees to the
client of the legal services office 134 or to a third party such as a
state's general fund for legal services. 131
2. Judges can rule on the constitutionality of any proposed
withdrawal of legal services counsel that is driven by the restric-
tions. If necessary, judges can actually prevent counsel from with-
drawing, holding that the restrictions requiring withdrawal are
unconstitutional in the context of that particular case. 136
3. Judges and organizations reflecting their concerns can study
the effects of legal services restrictions and inadequate funding for
legal services on courts, litigants, lawyers, and the larger society.
They can speak out about the adverse consequences and legality of
restrictions and inadequate funding in settings including the legisla-
ture, the amicus brief process, 137 the media at large, conferences,
134. The Supreme Court has held that attorneys' fee awards are generally the prop-
erty of clients, not of their attorneys. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730 (1986).
135. LSC has endorsed the idea of judges awarding attorneys' fees to third parties.
See LSC Office of Legal Affairs, External Op. 2001-1007 (2001) ("You might recom-
mend that the judge order the fees which would have been paid to your program to be
paid by the defendant directly to some other worthwhile charity. A donation to the
local battered women's shelter (or another organization that promotes the elimina-
tion of domestic violence) might be an appropriate alternative in this circumstance.").
136. In 1996, some judges refused to grant legal services lawyers' conditional mo-
tions to withdraw, ruling instead that the lawyers must be permitted to continue as
counsel in light of client's concerns and constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Varshavsky
v. Perales, No. 40767/91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 1996). See also Udell, supra note 93,
at 341, 343-44. Additionally, according to documents received by the authors from
LSC pursuant to a FOIA request, in 1996 a court, acting pursuant to Illinois Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.16, denied a request by LSC grantee Legal Aid Foundation of
Chicago to withdraw from a class action because it determined that the class would be
"prejudiced" if the attorney withdrew.
137. For example, the American Judicature Society filed an amicus brief in support
of the plaintiffs in the Velazquez case. See Brief for Amicus Curiae The American
Judicature Society in Support of Respondents, Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531
U.S. 533 (2001).
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law reviews, 13 and elsewhere. Judges can also encourage state and
local legislatures and IOLTA funds to provide money for legal ser-
vices and to avoid imposing restrictions on that funding. Judges
can do this by establishing court offices or designating personnel to
deal with justice issues.' 39 They can also establish or participate in
commissions, task forces, working groups and other efforts to ad-
dress gaps in the provision of legal representation to the poor
caused by legal services restrictions and inadequate federal, state,
and local funding for legal services. 4 °
4. In some states, judges can play a significant role in deciding
how filing fees and other funds for legal services should ultimately
be spent. 4' In those states, judges may see ways to avoid imposing
restrictions that ultimately handicap the work of the courts them-
selves in dispensing justice.
5. Judges can rule on motions to appoint counsel, write about
problems that occur when they are unable to appoint counsel, and
explore the legal bases for recognizing a right to counsel.1 42
6. Judges can recognize the predicament of pro se litigants, un-
derstanding that there may be insufficient numbers of legal services
and other lawyers available to take certain categories of cases.
They can, for example, promulgate rules or issue opinions giving
judges special responsibilities to ensure that justice is done in cases
138. For examples of judges who have written law review articles containing criti-
cism of the restrictions, see Johnson, supra note 104 and Sweet, supra note 104.
139. For example, New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye has cre-
ated the New York State Access to Justice Center, headed by Deputy Chief Adminis-
trative Judge for Justice Initiatives Hon. Juanita Bing Newton, who is charged with,
among other things, assessing gaps in legal services delivery and working with the
legislature and the public to increase funding for civil legal services. Press Release,
Hon. Jonathan Lippman, : Chief Judge Targets Shortfall of Civil Legal Services for
New York's Poor (Sep. 11, 2001), at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/pr200l_16.html;
Press Release, Hon. Jonathan Lippman,: Judge Juanita Bing Newton Appointed
Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for Justice Initiatives (June 29, 1999), at http://
www.courts.state.ny.us/pr99-13.html.
140. For example, the Montana Supreme Court has established an Equal Justice
Task Force "to examine the unmet legal needs of low and moderate income people,
and to work toward adequate funding for civil access to justice." The task force was
created partly in order to respond to the constraints of the federal restrictions. Mary
Helen McNeal, Montana's New Equal Justice Task Force Has Gotten Down to Work,
MONTANA L., Sept. 2001, at 8.
141. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., In re Nicholson, No. 00-CV-2229, 2001 WL 1661707, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 21, 2001).
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involving pro se litigants.143 They can also make court staff availa-
ble to directly help pro se litigants, create written materials to help
pro se litigants, or make space available in courthouses where at-
torneys can help pro se litigants.144
143. See Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor.
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987,
2013-17 (1999) (listing court rules and cases requiring judges to assist pro se litigants,
including by construing their pleadings liberally and explaining rules to them).
144. Id. at 1999-2003 (describing various initiatives).
